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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S EFFECTS
ON CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT MINORS FROM
OBSCENITY ON THE INTERNET'
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)
JonathanD. Wallace"

The Petitioner' passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which
criminalized posting material harmful to minors on the World Wide Web
absent compliance with enumerated age verification procedures.2
Respondents 3 alleged that COPA was unconstitutional because it
unnecessarily restricted constitutionally protected speech for adults.4
Respondents filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania seeking an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the Act.5
The District Court found that COPA would burden some protected speech
and Petitioner was unlikely to prove COPA was the least restrictive means
available to achieve Congress's goal of shielding minors from harmful
materials over the Internet.6 Thus, the District Court granted Respondent's
request for a preliminary injunction.7 Petitioner appealed and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed The U.S. Supreme Court

* Editor's Note: This work received the Spring 2005 Huber C. Hurst Award for the
Outstanding Case Comment.
** J.D. anticipated 2006, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S.B.A. 2003,
University of Florida Warrington College of Business Administration. I would like to thank my
family for their unconditional love and support, Stephanie for her patience and encouragement, and
my friends who have made my legal education such a rewarding and enjoyable experience.
1. Petitioner was Attorney General Ashcroft, acting on behalfof the United States Congress.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
2. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (2005).
3. Respondents included the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and organizations
comprised of Internet content providers, as well as other parties concerned with protecting free
speech. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2783, 2790.
4. Id. at 2791.
5. Id. at 2790.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2790. The Court of Appeals concluded that the phrase "community
standards" rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
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granted certiorari.9 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to
the Appellate Court, ° which again affirmed the District Court's
preliminary injunction." The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari once
again.' 2 The Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction because
Petitioner failed to rebut Respondent's argument that proposed less
restrictive alternatives were as effective as COPA. 3
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech."' 4 This protection ensures the free
flow of expression and ideas. 5 The framers held this free flow essential to
the functioning of a democratic society.16 However, not all speech enjoys
absolute constitutional protection. 7 Precedent suggests that the Supreme
Court has always inherently assumed that obscenity is a category of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment.' 8 The Court confirmed this
assumption with an explicit ruling in Roth v. United States.'9
In Roth the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
federal obscenity statute used to convict a business owner for mailing
obscene advertisements and books violated the First Amendment.2" The
Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection does not apply to
obscenity.2 ' Thus, the Court found that obscene speech is subject to

9. Id.
10. Id.The U.S. Supreme Court held that the community standards language alone did not
make COPA overbroad. Id.
11. Id.The U.S. Court of Appeals held that COPA was not narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest, was overbroad, and was not the least restrictive alternative available to prevent
minors from accessing harmful material on the Internet. Id.
12. Id.
13. Ashcroft, 124 S.Ct. at 2795. The Court also recognized other practical reasons to affirm
the injunction. Id. at 2794-95. First, the potential harms of reversing the injunction outweighed
those of affirming it by mistake. Id. at 2794. Second, serious evidential disputes remained. See id.
Third, technological advances important to a proper analysis of the constitutional question had
developed in the five years since the district court heard the case. Id.at 2794-95. Finally, since the
commencement of litigation, two new statutes had been passed that may have been less restrictive
alternatives to COPA. Ashcroft, 124 S.Ct. at 2795 (referring to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B and 47
U.S.C.A. § 941 (2004)).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3.
15. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 484-85.
18. See id. at 481.
19. Id.at 485.
20. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479-81.
21. Id. at485.

CASE COMMENT

regulation.22 Justice Brennan reasoned that obscenity completely lacked
the redeeming social value the First Amendment sought to protect and that
the interests of order and23morality clearly outweighed any possible benefit
derived from obscenity.
The Court then rejected a standard that evaluated obscenity simply by
the effect of an isolated passage on the most susceptible persons.24 Instead,
the Court ruled that obscenity must be judged by the effects the material
as a whole had on an average person's prurient interest, applying
contemporary community standards.25 Petitioner did not challenge the
finding that the mailings were obscene, but rather the constitutionality of
the statute criminalizing distribution of such mailings.26 Thus, the Court
affirmed Petitioner's conviction.27
With Roth as precedent, the Court continued to recognize obscenity as
unprotected speech. 28 However, sixteen years of uncertainty regarding
what constitutes legally obscene material forced the Court to formulate a
more concrete definition in Miller v. California.29 In Miller, the petitioner
was convicted of violating a California obscenity statute because he
knowingly distributed obscene advertisements through the mail.3" The
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the state statute, which the
California courts interpreted as establishing a notion of statewide
"contemporary community standards" to determine whether the materials
he distributed were obscene.31
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that speech would be considered
obscene if it met three requirements.32 First, the material as a whole must
appeal to a reasonable person's prurient interest, applying contemporary
community standards.33 Second, the material must depict or describe, in a

22. Id. at 488.
23. See id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
Obscenity was defined as "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest." Id. at 487.
24. See id. 488-90.
25. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. Prurient describes "material having a tendencyto excite lustful
thoughts." Id. at 488 n.20.
26. Id. at 479-80.
27. Id. at 494.
28. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 36 (1973).
29. See id. at 29. The Court described the history of obscenity regulation as problematic,
tortured, and as a strain on the courts. See id. at 20, 29.
30. See id. at 22, 24, 29.
31. See Brief of Petitioner at 3, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (No. 70-73).
32. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 22, 29.
33. Id.
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patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by state law.3 4 Third, the
material, taken as a whole, must lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Concluding that the Appellant was originally convicted
under a more limited understanding of obscenity, the Court vacated and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the new
obscenity standard.36
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to apply the Miller standard to
classify obscenity.37 In Reno v. American CivilLiberties Union, Appellees
questioned the constitutionality of two key provisions of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) by requesting an injunction.3" One
provision criminalized knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent
messages to minors using the Internet. 39 The other provision prohibited
using the Internet to knowingly send or display patently offensive
messages to minors that depict or describe sexual activities or organs.4 °
The Supreme Court again acknowledged the prohibition of obscene
speech. 4' However, the CDA was overbroad due to ambiguous language
that encroached upon protected speech. 42 The Court found that the vague
terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" could ultimately silence some
speakers whose message would be constitutionally protected.43
As a matter of policy, Justice Stevens was not willing to limit adults to
speech fit for minors. 44 He reasoned that any legislation that encumbered
protected speech was presumptively invalid. 4' However, the government
could rebut this presumption by proving that the legislation was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' The government failed to
rebut Appellee's contention that less restrictive alternatives would be as

34. Id.

35. Id.
36. See id. at 36-37.
37. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872-74 (1997).
38. Id. at 849.

39. Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1994); see also Reno, 521
U.S. at 859.
40. U.S.C.A. § 223(d). The statute listed several affirmative defenses. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e).
Such defenses included good faith efforts to restrict access to only adults by requiring credit card
verification or adult identification codes before transmitting targeted material. Id. § 223(e)(5)(A).
41. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 882-83 (applying the statute's severability clause to uphold the
CDA insofar as it regulated obscenity).
42. See id. at 870-72.
43. See id. at 874, 877.
44. See id. at 875.
45. See id. at 882.
46. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.
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effective as the CDA.47 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court's injunction. 48 Even with the government's strong interest in
protecting minors, the burden imposed on protected speech could not
49 be
justified if it could be avoided by drafting the statute more carefully.
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court continued its application of
the Miller obscenity standard and again held that any government
regulation of non-obscene material must be subjected to the most exacting
level of review.50 COPA was Congress's response to the Reno decision.5 '
The Act criminalized the commercial posting of material harmful to
minors on the Internet unless one took precautionary steps to prevent
minors from accessing such material.52 The instant Court accepted the
District Court's finding that COPA burdened some protected speech.53
Justice Kennedy reasoned that to ensure protected speech was restricted
no further than necessary to achieve the compelling goal of protecting
minors from harmful material, the government bore the burden of proving
that any proposed alternatives would be less effective than COPA.5 4
The instant Court concluded that alternatives proposed by Respondent
would be less restrictive on protected speech and were likely a more
effective means of achieving Congress's goal.55 Accordingly, the
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of COPA was affirmed
upon the instant Court's56 finding that the District Court's decision was not
an abuse of discretion.

47. See id.
48. Id. at 885.
49. See id. at 874.
50. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
51. Id. at2789.
52. See id. Those in compliance with precautionary procedures were provided an affirmative
defense. Id. Such preventive procedures were similar to the provisions present in Reno v. ACLU.
See also supra note 39.
53. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2791. However, Justice Scalia concluded that the speech
burdened by COPA enjoyed no constitutional protection and could have been banned entirely. See
id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. See id.at 2791.
55. See id. at 2794. The Supreme Court concentrated on blocking and filtering software as
less restrictive alternatives to COPA. See id. at 2792-94. The Government argued that such options
were not available alternatives because Congress may not mandate their use. See id. at 2793. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument. See id. The Government's claim carried little weight
because the Court reasoned that Congress could encourage software implementation and promote
software development by offering strong incentives to cooperative parties. See id.
56. Id. at 2795.
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In his concurrence, Justice Stevens emphasized how criminal
legislation was "an inappropriate means to regulate [obscenity].' 7 He
argued that COPA was overly harsh because those in violation of the
statute would be subject to imprisonment and large fines.5" Also, the Act's
affirmative defenses would only force those prosecuted to bear the burden
of proving compliance.59 Finally, Justice Stevens reasoned that the blurred
line separating the obscene from the non-obscene makes criminalizing
obscenity inappropriate.60
Justice Breyer's dissent recognized that COPA only regulated legally
obscene material and very little more.61 Justice Breyer pointed out that
COPA defined material harmful to minors with nearly the exact language
the U.S. Supreme Court used in the Miller obscenity standard.62 He noted
the only important difference between the two definitions was that the first
two prongs of the COPA definition of "harmful to minors" included the
phrase "with respect to minors" and the third included the phrase "for

57. See id. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. See id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. See id. 2798-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Miller obscenity standard defines material
to be legally obscene if:
(a)... the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b)...
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) ... the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 2798 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). COPA
defines material to be within its scope of regulation if:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, [that the material] is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B)[the
material] depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and (C) [the material] taken as a whole, lacks
Serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific valuefor minors.
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C.A. §231 (2005) (emphasis added).
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minors. 63 Justice Breyer determined that this language discrepancy only
64
slightly restricted some speech that is obscene to minors but not to adults.
Arguing that the alternatives proposed by Respondent were more
restrictive than the small burden imposed on protected speech, Justice
Breyer claimed COPA was sufficiently narrowly tailored to overcome the
government's burden.65
By affirming the preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of
COPA,66 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the significance of the
First Amendment's mission to protect all speech with any redeeming
social value. 67 The Supreme Court granted the same protection to the
borderline obscene as it would to any other fundamental right. 68 However,
the Court's decision severely hindered Congress's ability to regulate
material harmful to minors over the Internet, 69 especially when Congress's
choice for regulation is criminal legislation.7" Ultimately, the decision
leaves a lingering question concerning future congressional attempts to
protect minors from obscenity on the Internet.
The instant case suggests that as long as the U.S. Supreme Court
chooses to use the Miller standard to define obscenity, Congress's attempts
to regulate material specifically obscene to minors will likely encroach
upon protected speech. 7' The Reno decision sent the message to Congress
that the next time it tried to regulate obscenity on the Internet, it must draft
the legislation carefully so as not to infringe upon protected speech.72
Congress relied on this decision and drafted COPA in the most cautious

63. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Congress's efforts
to match the material COPA regulated to the interests of minors). However, COPA is also different
from the Miller obscenity standard in that it defines sexually offensive conduct, where the Miller
standard left this definition open to state interpretation. See Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973).
64. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute's
overbreadth did not extend beyond borderline cases).
65. See id. at 2804 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2795.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
68. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2791.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
70. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 2798-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882
(1997).
72. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (stating that "[tlhe burden on adult speech is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective" in achieving the congressional purpose);
see also Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2788-89.
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way possible.73 Congress defined what it was attempting to regulate with
nearly the exact language it knew courts would use to judge the statute's
constitutionality in the likely event of a constitutional challenge.74
However, to be sure the legislation protected the particular interests of
minors, Congress included the phrases "with respect to minors" and "for
minors" in the definition of the material being regulated.75
This slight variation in language resulted in COPA regulating not the
legally obscene but rather what was obscene to minors.76 The Miller
obscenity standard requires that material appeal to a reasonable person's
prurient interest.7 7 However, COPA regulated material that appealed
specifically to a minor's prurient interest. 78 Although most material that
appeals to the prurient interest of a minor also appeals to the prurient
interests of an adult, 79 the burden placed upon the small amount of material
obscene to minors, but not to adults, caused COPA to intrude into material
not defined as obscenity under the Miller standard.8" Thus, the instant case
demonstrates that if courts continue to apply the Miller standard to judge
obscenity, any regulation of material obscene specifically to minors will
violate some small amount of constitutionally protected speech, regardless
of Congress's best efforts to avoid such violation."
Whether such encroachments on protected speech will be
unconstitutional is very much determined by what level of protection the

73. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. See supra note 60. The Supreme Court invalidated the CDA in the Reno decision nearly
a year before Congress passed COPA. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885. Therefore, at the time they were
drafting COPA, Congress knew precisely what standard of obscenity the Court would be likely to
use if the constitutionality of COPA should be questioned in the future. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at
2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. See supra note 60.
76. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2799-2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. This part of the Miller obscenity standard requires that "(a) ... the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest..." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
78. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2799-2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Justice Breyer argues that very little material appeals to a child's prurient interest that
does not also appeal to an adult. See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer even
suggests that the scope of what appeals to an adult's prurient interest may be more expansive than
that of a minor because some pre-pubescent minors may not yet sexually respond. See id. (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer refers to this area as borderline
obscene material. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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U.S. Supreme Court decides to assign to the burdened speech.82 The
instant Court continues the established practice of subjecting the
government to the highest level of scrutiny when legislation regulates
speech protected by the First Amendment.83 If the Court implements this
standard of review in the future, it is likely to continue to invalidate
statutes like COPA.8 Although laws protecting minors from harmful85
material on the Internet are likely to serve a compelling state interest,
Congress's challenge remains to narrowly tailor legislation specifically to
meet this interest.86 This is a very tough burden to overcome.87 The
Supreme Court will automatically presume that any statute restricting
protected speech is invalid.88 Then the government is burdened with
disproving the assumption that the alternatives proposed by a challenger
are both less restrictive on protected speech and as effective as the statute
at fulfilling Congress's objective.89
Given this difficult task, criminal legislation will rarely be the least
restrictive alternative means of protecting minors from obscenity on the
Internet.9 ° In American jurisprudence, criminal sanctions are the most
severe form of discipline.91 As Justice Steven's concurrence in the instant
case makes clear, any effective alternative is likely to be less restrictive
than criminal prosecution.92 Thus, attempts to criminalize constitutionally
protected speech subject to the most exacting level of scrutiny are likely
to fail. 93
82. See id. at 2791 (applying strict scrutiny review lead to the affirmation of an injunction
against COPA); cf id.at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the application of strict scrutiny
by the majority was improper and applying a lesser standard of review would have lead to the
injunction on COPA being lifted).
83. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2791; see generally United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 816 (2000) (using strict scrutiny to declare unconstitutional a statute that
required cable providers to fully block signals to sexually oriented television or limit the hours of
transmission to times children were unlikely to be viewing).
84. See Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2791; see also Playboy, 529 U.S. 803 at 827; Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
85. In Reno, Justice Stevens noted that the Supreme Court had repeatedly recognized the
compelling governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. See Reno, 521 U.S.
at 874.
86. See Ashcrofi, 124 S. Ct. at 2791-93, 2795.
87. See id. at 2791-92 (discussing the Government's burden of proof).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. See Ashcrofi, 124 S. Ct. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The instant Court ultimately chose to elevate the rights of commercial
pornographers and their patrons above Congress's objective of shielding
American children from obscenity.94 As the law currently stands, future
congressional attempts to protect minors by criminalizing the unregulated
proliferation of materials obscene specifically to minors over the Internet
will likely encroach on some speech that enjoys the protection of strict
scrutiny review.9" Thus, Congress will likely continue to fail in such
legislative attempts until the U.S. Supreme Court chooses to change its
position on obscenity.
The Supreme Court could easily choose to exercise such power. First,
the Court could choose to expand the definition of obscenity to encompass
what is obscene to the most susceptible individuals.96 Adopting this
definition would allow Congress to criminalize materials specifically
obscene to minors that fall within the scope of obscenity without
encroaching upon protected speech. Given the historical turmoil
surrounding the Supreme Court's struggle with obscenity, a different,
more encompassing definition is probable.97 Alternatively, the Supreme
Court may choose to continue to apply the Miller obscenity standard, but
lower the level of protection assigned to the burdened speech. Invalidation
of legislation criminalizing protected speech would not occur nearly as
often if the government action was not subjected to such a high level of
scrutiny.9" Considering the most carefully drafted legislation on point only
burdens a small amount of borderline obscene speech, the Supreme Court
could simply justify this downgrade of protection status in the interest of
defending our children's innocence. 99

94. See id. at 2804-06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. See supratext accompanying notes 73-92.
96. Contra Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,875 (1997) (refusing to limit adults to speech fit
for minors).
97. See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
98. See supratext accompanying notes 81-92.
99. See Ashcrofi v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2798-2800, 2804-06 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

